Confidence through Compliance in Emissions Trading Markets. CEPS Policy Briefs No. 99, 21 April 2006 by Kruger, Joe & Egenhofer, Christian.
Available for free downloading from the CEPS website (http://www.ceps.be) 
© CEPS 2006 
T
h
i
n
k
i
n
g
 
a
h
e
a
d
 
f
o
r
 
E
u
r
o
p
e
 
 
Confidence through Compliance in 
Emissions Trading Markets 
Joe Kruger and Christian Egenhofer 
 
 
 
Introduction 
Emissions trading is a market-based mechanism 
designed to allow firms to choose the most cost-
effective strategy to meet environmental 
standards. The success of SO2 and NOx 
emissions trading systems in the United States 
and the launch of the ambitious European Union 
Emissions Trading System (EU ETS) 
underscore the value of emissions trading as a 
tool for environmental policy. 
As more and more countries accept the need to 
address climate change on a priority basis, 
emissions trading will play an increasingly 
significant role as a governance strategy that not 
only creates incentives for firms to cut 
greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions but also spurs 
technological innovation that ensures this is done 
at the lowest cost. But only with high levels of 
compliance will emissions trading systems achieve 
reductions in GHG emissions efficiently, 
effectively and equitably. Achievement of high 
levels of compliance hinges on robust and effective 
strategies for monitoring, reporting, and verification, 
where confidence in the system relies on timely and 
accurate information on emissions levels, allowance 
holdings and trades. Without such reliable data, the 
system fails to meet its environmental objectives.  
The central focus of the workshop on Confidence 
through Compliance in Emissions Trading Markets, 
which took place in November 2005 in Washington, 
D.C., was on the monitoring, reporting and 
verification (MRV) of emissions trading and 
associated cross-border strategies and issues, as these 
are the main elements of any effective compliance 
and enforcement strategy.
1 The International 
Network for Environmental Compliance & 
Enforcement (INECE), in cooperation with its 
partners, The Netherlands Ministry for Housing, 
Spatial Planning and the Environment (VROM), The 
Environment Agency (England and Wales), the 
European Commission, the US Environmental 
Protection Agency, the Washington College of Law 
at the American University, and Resources for the 
Future, organised the workshop as a follow-up to the 
international conference on Compliance and 
Enforcement of Trading Schemes in Environmental 
Protection, hosted by the US Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) and INECE in March 2004 
at Oxford University.
2 
The workshop explored the role of compliance and 
enforcement (C&E) strategies in emissions trading 
                                                        
1 See generally Zaelke et al. (2005). 
2 For more information, see http://www.inece.org/ 
emissions/workshop.html. 
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systems as essential elements in maintaining a trading 
system’s environmental effectiveness and economic 
efficiency. Specifically, the goals of the Workshop 
were to: 
•  develop a set of best practices for achieving C&E 
in emissions trading programmes; 
•  raise awareness of the value and importance of 
trading programmes and emphasising the role 
that C&E play in achieving environmental 
objectives and ensuring market credibility and 
investor confidence; 
•  identify key requirements of effective emissions 
trading systems; and  
•  assess available information and define 
additional needs for creating an operational 
‘common currency’ and a network allowing 
(inter)national trading among different trading 
systems. 
This policy brief examines MRV strategies of the EU 
ETS, the US Environmental Protection Agency’s SO2 
and NOx trading programmes, and, to the extent 
applicable, the new Dutch NOx trading system. This 
paper also compares regulatory cultures and MRV 
models in the EU and the US and highlights key 
challenges to achieving high levels of compliance. 
Introduction to Key Concepts 
The use of emissions trading systems as an 
alternative to more traditional forms of regulation 
requires a fresh look at the relationship between the 
regulator and the regulated community, as well as 
other key regulatory concepts.
3 This section explores 
the different responsibilities and risks of emissions 
trading systems for both the regulator and the 
regulated community.  
Monitoring, Reporting and Verification 
Under traditional command-and-control regimes, 
firms must follow a relatively strict set of procedures 
to meet environmental standards and are sanctioned 
when they fail to do so. By comparison, under 
emissions trading systems, firms are free to choose 
their own compliance strategy – including how much 
to emit and how many allowances to trade. For the 
regulator, this choice presents a new set of 
responsibilities. To be able to sanction firms for 
whose emissions exceed their allowance holdings and 
provide market participants with timely and accurate 
information, the regulator must track both the 
emissions levels and the number of allowances each 
firm possesses at a given time. As many systems 
                                                        
3 See Stranlund et al. (2002). 
involve self-reported data, the regulator must 
consider penalties for firms that falsify information. 
Consequently, the regulator’s role is “no longer that 
of grandly deciding what is best for firms and 
individuals, entertaining equitable appeals, and 
enforcing the results”.
4 Rather, the regulator acts 
more like an accountant or a bank’s credit 
department.
5 This results in an emissions trading 
system whose market efficiency and investor 
confidence hinge on the MRV strategies the regulator 
chooses to implement and enforce in the pursuit of 
adequate levels of compliance.  
Common Interests in Compliance 
Unlike command-and-control regimes, participation 
in an emissions trading system allows for both the 
regulator and the regulated community to share a 
common interest in pursuing high levels of 
compliance. Because allowances are an intangible 
asset,
6 a firm that invests in allowances to cover some 
of its emissions has the same concerns as the 
regulator over market integrity and the need for 
fraud-proof MRV in order to avoid cheating and 
other risks that would decrease the value of 
allowances and possibly undermine the system 
altogether.  
Originally, the EU’s interest in market-based systems 
was at least in part driven by the EU’s mixed record 
on uniform implementation.
7 The European 
Commission and the European Court of Justice
8 
could not always ensure adequate implementation, 
enforcement and, by extension, compliance. This is 
partly why the European Commission initially 
preferred a carbon/energy tax to tackle climate 
change. It was thought that member states had an 
interest in improving on implementation and 
enforcement to collect the revenues associated with 
tax. But the tax proposal was eventually abandoned 
due to lack of support among EU governments.  
Transparency and Public Perception 
Transparent regulatory regimes and markets provide 
the public with timely and accurate information based 
on MRV data as a means to instil trust and 
                                                        
4 See Ellerman (1998). 
5 See Kruger (2005). 
6 That is, they behave like property rights in a market. 
7 The compliance gap between EU member states was 
identified as early as the 1990s. 
8 The European Commission as the ‘guardian of the treaty’ 
has responsibility to ensure that EU legislation is properly 
transposed into national law and to supervise 
implementation. The latter task requires close cooperation 
with member states. Confidence through Compliance in Emissions Trading Markets | 3 
 
confidence in the market with evidence of high 
compliance. Given the importance and sensitivity of 
MRV data, it follows that the market participants and 
the public in general are more likely to trust its 
veracity if the process by which it is collected and 
verified is perceived as open and accountable.  
Transparency also helps counter some of the negative 
misconceptions about emissions trading systems, 
such as that they provide polluters with the right to 
pollute.
9 In fact, emissions trading systems, 
consistent with the polluter pays principle, help pass 
some of the cost of pollution control to the consumer 
of pollution-intensive products by imposing the costs 
of environmental harm on those who cause it and 
those who benefit from it.
10  
Comparing Regulatory Cultures 
The following section describes the regulatory 
cultures for the United States and the EU. The 
description of the EU regulatory culture will 
concentrate on the EU layer of government and 
reference the differences among EU member states 
when necessary. When comparing the two cultures, it 
is important to keep in mind two fundamental 
differences between the United States and EU. First, 
the US system has been up and running for the past 
decade while the EU ETS began this year and must 
still be considered a ‘work in progress’. Second, the 
US programmes operate within a single jurisdiction, 
while the EU ETS is subject to a multi-jurisdictional 
political environment. 
US Regulatory Culture 
The United States has more than a decade of 
experience of operating ‘cap and trade’ programmes, 
and there are well-established procedures for 
compliance and enforcement. In general, these 
programmes are operated centrally by the US 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
11 MRV for 
the US SO2 and NOx programmes is characterised by 
detailed rules, electronic reporting and auditing, and a 
                                                        
9 See, e.g. Kruger (2005) who cites the example of an 
opinion piece in USA Today, arguing that as a result of 
allowance trading people would die. For a long period 
there have been claims by some EU policy makers that 
Europeans do not like a situation where people make 
money with pollution. During the discussions and 
negotiations, such opposition was also heard from some 
parts of the non-governmental organisation communities 
and occasionally from parliamentarians.)   
10 See Costanza et al. (1997). 
11 However, some states participate in monitoring activities 
in both the SO2 and NOx programmes, and State 
governments have the lead in enforcement actions in the 
NOx programme.  
variety of quality assurance and quality control 
requirements. Although continuous emissions 
monitors (CEMs) play an important role in US 
programmes, many sources are permitted to use 
alternative methods to measure emissions, such as 
approaches using fuel metres and emission factors.
12 
Finally, although the MRV system used in US trading 
programmes has not been used to implement a CO2 
trading system, it has been used to collect and verify 
CO2 emissions data from the electric power sector.
13 
This section will focus largely on the regulatory 
culture and approach of the US SO2 and NOx 
programmes. Later in the article, there will be a brief 
discussion of the issues that would arise if the United 
States were to develop a compliance system for a 
greenhouse gas programme. 
In US SO2 and NOx programs, approximately 75 
percent of staff resources (75 people, including 
personnel in regional EPA offices and state agencies) 
are focused on the measurement, verification and 
tracking of emissions data. Government 
administrators also provide policy guidance on 
measurement issues, develop and operate the 
information systems that track emissions and 
allowances, certify monitoring equipment, verify 
reported emissions data, and audit facilities.
14 
However, the US SO2  and NOx programmes are 
much smaller than the EU ETS. Combined, the two 
US schemes cover considerably less than half of the 
EU ETS installations. More importantly, an EU 
installation could contain multiple sources of 
emissions, while a US ‘unit’ is just one boiler. 
Although the main organising principle of 
programme administrators is maintaining 
accountability for the system, an important secondary 
goal is providing administrative certainty. 
Programme administrators have tried to create 
administrative certainty by making programme 
operations routine and not subject to discretion. The 
routine nature and lack of regulatory discretion of the 
US trading programmes manifests itself in several 
ways. First, the rules for emissions monitoring are 
detailed and prescriptive, leaving little discretion for 
either companies or regulators. Second, there is 
heavy reliance on information technologies to operate 
the programme and to automate routine procedures. 
Finally, excess emissions penalties are non-
discretionary and automatic. The following section 
                                                        
12 For example, although 96% of emissions in the US SO2 
programme are monitored with continuous emissions 
monitors (CEMs), only 36% of regulated ‘units’ are 
required to use CEMs. 
13 Approximately 40% of units that report carbon dioxide 
(CO2) emissions to US Environmental Protection Agency 
use CEMs and 60% use alternative methods.  
14 Environmental Protection Agency (2003). 4 | Kruger & Egenhofer 
 
describes these aspects of the US model as well as 
discusses the compliance promotion role played by 
public access to emissions and allowance data. 
Monitoring, Reporting and Verification 
The MRV process begins with facilities choosing 
their monitoring equipment and sending a monitoring 
plan to EPA. Under some circumstances, participants 
may apply for alternative monitoring methods (e.g. in 
the SO2 programme, gas-fired units may use fuel 
flow metres and emissions factors), which must be 
approved by EPA. Government authorities review 
monitoring plans and provide feedback to industry. 
Industry must then conduct a series of certification 
tests of their monitoring equipment and provide these 
test results to government authorities in the form of a 
certification application. After certification, facilities 
begin to monitor emissions and conduct the required 
ongoing quality assurance and quality control 
(QA/QC) tests. 
Participants in the programmes must report emissions 
to EPA electronically every quarter in a standard 
format. Many participants use software developed by 
EPA or others pre-screen their electronic reports 
before sending them to EPA. This software runs 
many of the same checks as EPA's computers and is 
designed to minimise the numbers of errors in 
submitted reports. 
EPA computers receive the electronic reports, review 
the data, and provide feedback to company officials. 
This electronic feedback is generally of three types. 
Officials at facilities are informed that either: 1) their 
data have been accepted and will be stored in EPA’s 
database for the purpose of compliance 
determinations and public data dissemination; 2) their 
data have been rejected because of specified critical 
errors; or 3) their data have been accepted, but EPA 
has identified errors that must be corrected in later 
data submissions. If there are problems with the data, 
company officials are able to follow up with  EPA 
monitoring specialists who are assigned to their 
facilities. 
In addition to this first round of electronic review and 
processing, EPA uses software to audit the data and 
identify potential discrepancies or issues to 
investigate. These audits review emissions or 
measured fuel data as well as the results of quality 
assurance and quality control tests performed on the 
measurement equipment. EPA uses these electronic 
‘desk’ audits to target more in-depth field audits. 
Such field audits may include observing quality 
assurance tests, reviewing on-site records, inspecting 
measurement equipment, and/or comparing installed 
measurement equipment to independent reference 
methods. Field audits are usually done in teams 
together with state and local environmental agencies. 
Where possible, regulatory officials (usually from 
local agencies) observe QA/QC testing of emissions 
measurement equipment. The purpose of the audit is 
to verify that the testing is completed according to 
standard procedures and accurately represented in the 
reports to EPA. Field audits are performed on both 
random samples of all sources and on sources 
identified with potential measurement or data 
problems during the electronic desk audits. 
Detailed Rules for Emissions Monitoring and 
Reporting 
Monitoring rules are highly detailed in the US SO2 
and NOx programmes. The regulations for 
monitoring cover almost 300 pages and provide 
thorough standards for installation and certification 
of monitors, quality assurance and testing, handling 
of missing data, recordkeeping and other features.
 
Most of these rules are now incorporated into 
software systems at both the companies and EPA so 
that the reporting and review of emissions reports are 
highly standardised. 
To a certain extent, the use of CEMs in the US 
trading system has required this more prescriptive 
approach. However, even when units use alternative 
emissions monitoring methods, the requirements are 
quite detailed. For example, there are 30 pages of 
regulations for a monitoring method used by gas-
fired units that uses fuel metering and emissions 
factors. 
To provide certainty and ensure consistency, EPA 
devotes extensive resources to answering and 
documenting questions that arise about monitoring 
requirements. EPA has an online policy manual that 
is largely in a question-and-answer format. It has 
been updated more than a dozen times over the life of 
the programme and is now nearly 500 pages long. 
These detailed monitoring and reporting 
requirements, though complex, have provided 
companies with considerable certainty that, if they 
follow the procedures, their emissions reports will be 
accepted in a timely manner. 
Extensive Use of Information Technology 
The routine nature of the decisions that regulators 
make and the vast amounts of emissions and 
allowance data that must be handled have allowed 
regulators to build the operation of the trading 
programme largely around information technology.
15 
For example, companies are required to report 
emissions data to EPA in a standardised electronic 
format. Once the data are received, EPA computers 
run quality assurance tests and give electronic 
feedback to companies. Additional software is used 
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to run electronic audits on emissions reports. 
Emissions data are maintained in a database that is 
accessible via the internet.
16  
EPA’s allowance registry is similar to an online 
banking system, with companies able to manage their 
allowance accounts and make transfers without 
submitting paper forms. Approximately 80% of all 
transfers of allowances are now done over the 
internet by the sources themselves. Similarly, EPA 
has implemented a new application that allows 
companies to log onto a secure website and perform 
functions that were previously done with paper 
forms. These include changing information about 
company officials who are authorised to act for an 
allowance account, submitting data about new or 
retired emissions sources, and determining whether a 
source is required to participate in the programme.
17 
Electronic reporting and processing of data have been 
critical in meeting the tight timeframes for the annual 
compliance true-up period. Companies submit their 
final quarter’s emissions data by January 31
st and 
have until March 1
st to transfer allowances and 
submit final compliance certification forms. EPA 
then completes verification of the annual emissions 
data and compares them electronically with 
allowances within the accounts of each unit. 
Typically, this process is completed by June. 
Finally, through the development of standardised 
reporting formats and protocols, EPA and companies 
have meshed their data systems. Early in the 
programme, EPA developed and distributed software 
to help companies develop their emissions reporting 
systems.
18 Software used by companies to track 
allowances and emissions incorporates standardised 
EPA electronic reporting formats and allows 
companies to compare their own records of 
allowance holdings with those in the EPA registry. 
Compliance interactions between regulators and 
companies mainly involve resolving discrepancies 
over emissions data that arise in the quality assurance 
process. As discussed earlier, quarterly electronic 
reporting and feedback give companies adequate 
notice of data problems and time to correct these 
problems before the annual reconciliation of 
allowances and emissions data. Compliance is a 
largely routine process – allowances are 
electronically compared with emissions at each utility 
unit.  
                                                        
16 Husk & DeSantis (2002). 
17 Ibid. 
18 McLean (1997). 
Penalties and Enforcement Action for Non-
Compliance 
The certainty that a penalty will be imposed is a 
critical element in providing the correct incentives in 
an emissions trading programme. The automatic 
nature of excess emissions penalties in US trading 
programmes contrasts with the traditional regulatory 
approach in the United States, in which sources in 
violation negotiate for a regulatory exemption.
19 
Administrators of the US trading programme argue 
that the automatic nature of penalties and the 
certainty of other compliance-related provisions 
focus corporate resources and attention on low-cost 
compliance strategies rather than on lobbying or 
litigating to reduce costs.
20 In addition to the 
automatic excess emissions penalties, there is the 
authority to assess both civil and criminal penalties in 
US trading programmes. With an automatic penalty 
that is significantly higher than the market price for 
allowances and with a liquid market for allowances, 
there has been nearly one hundred percent 
compliance with the SO2 and NOx trading 
programmes.
21 
Public Access to Data 
In the United States, emissions data from the SO2 and 
NOx trading programmes are available to the public 
and may be accessed via the internet. There are no 
confidentiality requirements for this data. The public 
can also access data on allowance transfers among 
different accounts in EPA’s registry. Information 
technology has been the key to providing this 
transparency in the US emissions trading 
programmes, with all emissions and allowance data 
available online.
22 Some commentators note that 
public access to emissions and trading data builds 
confidence in the environmental results of the 
programme and provides an additional safeguard or 
incentive for compliance.
23 Environmental non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) in the United 
States have used emissions and allowance data for a 
variety of purposes, such as assessing the net 
environmental impact of emissions trades and 
analysing and comparing emissions profiles of 
companies. EPA facilitates transparency of emissions 
and allowance data by providing it in user-friendly 
                                                        
19 Ellerman, Joskow & Harrison (2003). 
20 Kruger (2005). 
21 In 10 years of operation, there have been 21 excess 
emissions penalties, ranging from $2,682 to $1,580,000. 
There have been nine additional civil penalties for other 
violations, such as failures to monitor and report emissions. 
See Kruger & Pizer (2004. 
22 Kruger et al. (2000). 
23 Environmental Protection Agency (2003) and Tietenberg 
(2003). 6 | Kruger & Egenhofer 
 
web-based formats. For example, tools on EPA’s 
website allow users to make customised queries of 
the data that are of the most interest.
24 
The EU Regulatory Culture 
While there is little doubt that the EU ETS has 
strongly been influenced by the US SO2  trading 
programme and the NOx Budget Trading 
Programme,
25 it differs in several important aspects. 
The principal difference is the high level of 
decentralisation and the significant degree of 
discretion for member states in the implementation 
phase, even if compared to the NOx Budget Trading 
Programme. For example, under the EU ETS, it is up 
to the member states to set policy on compliance and 
enforcement strategies as well as allocation, which 
includes the level of the cap and the exact 
methodology to be applied. The European 
Commission provides a broad set of guidelines for 
compliance and enforcement strategies, which give 
considerable flexibility to installations and to 
member states to develop specific monitoring 
procedures without imposing uniform, mandatory 
standards for emissions verification. The EU ETS 
also delegates responsibility for emissions 
verification to member states; however, the EU ETS 
requires this to be verified by a third party. Normally, 
this would be an independent third-party verifier and 
only in exceptional cases the government itself. 
Additionally, the member states are responsible for 
defining competence requirements and the rules and 
procedures for verifier accreditation. Initially, the EU 
ETS Directive foresees that each member state will 
have its own registry,
26 although joint registries 
between member states are permitted. Consequently, 
this decentralised approach leaves the European 
Commission Monitoring and Reporting Guidelines 
(MRG) about one-fourth the size of respective 
guidelines in the United States and much less 
detailed. 
A decentralised approach is consistent with the make-
up of the EU political system, based on sovereign 
member states with their own legal systems, 
                                                        
24 Husk & DeSantis (2002). 
25 See e.g. the 1999 study by the Center for Clean Air 
Policy (CCAP) commissioned by the Directorate General 
of Environment of the European Commission. Similarities 
include particularly the choice of a cap-and-trade model, 
grandfathering, emphasis on monitoring, reporting and 
verification, transparency and public involvement. See also 
Kruger & Pizer (2004 a & b). 
26 Registries are a precondition to track allowance account 
information, allowance holdings, and transfers of 
allowances among trading participants, as well as 
government administrative functions such as setting up 
allowance accounts, issuing, or retiring of allowances. 
traditions, and languages, where the EU layer of 
governance (Council of Ministers and the European 
Parliament) agrees on the framework, and member 
states enjoy a high level of discretion in 
implementing in their respective jurisdictions.
27 As 
there are as many jurisdictions as member states, one-
size-fits-all policies seldom are an option.
28 
Consistency across member states is sought by so-
called comitology committees, consisting of 
European Commission and member state officials 
who are responsible for the harmonisation of 
implementation provisions. The mandate (and hence 
the limit) of comitology committees are set both by 
the relevant provisions in the Directive and EU 
primary, secondary and case law such as EC internal 
and competition law.
29 Despite the fact that the EU 
exhibits elements of a federal system, one would miss 
the very essence of the diversity within the EU if one 
would perceive it as a federation.  
The high degree of decentralisation is – at least partly 
– also the result of consensual decision-making in the 
EU.
30 As the EU is made up of sovereign states, 
effective implementation of EU laws by member 
states is best ensured if legitimate member states’ 
concerns are taken into account during the 
negotiations in the Council of Ministers when the 
laws are formulated. As a result, initially the EU 
tends to choose decentralised options, followed by 
steps to establish and coordinate a common approach 
among member states. In the EU ETS framework, a 
common approach relies on using best practices to 
address issues jointly and share experiences among 
                                                        
27 Law that is adopted by the EU needs to be implemented 
and enforced by member states. This is among other parts 
of the principle of Community loyalty in Art. 10 of the 
European Community Treaty that guides the EU. 
28 In some cases, implementation of an EU law goes even 
beyond EU member states and may include non-EU 
countries grouped in the so-called European Economic 
Area (EEA). The concept of the EEA has been developed 
for those countries that do not wish to share the political 
objectives of the EU, such as progressive political 
integration, but want to benefit from economic integration. 
It allows for the full (and legally binding) integration of 
countries into the EU internal market without being a 
member. This approach is currently being applied to 
Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. See e.g. Emerson et al. 
(2002). 
29 The European Commission and the European Court of 
Justice have the right to control implementation and 
enforcement. However, this always requires cooperation of 
member states.  
30 Although the EU ETS, as almost all other internal 
market-related legislation, can be adopted by a qualified 
majority, voting is used only in exceptional cases. This 
holds even truer for important laws. The EU ETS was 
adopted unanimously by the Council of Ministers and by a 
large majority in the European Parliament.  Confidence through Compliance in Emissions Trading Markets | 7 
 
member states. But initial experiences usually feed 
into a formal review, which in many cases – 
including for the EU ETS – is built into the 
legislation.
31 Market solutions have in many 
instances proven easier than harmonisation across 25 
or more national jurisdictions, which display major 
differences in legal systems, enforcement cultures, 
and administrative capacities. In many cases, EU 
legislation is initiated by national legislation, 
reinforcing the tendency towards decentralisation.
32  
The EU MRV Model: Third-Party Verification 
Because the EU ETS began this year, it has not yet 
completed its first Reporting and Monitoring cycle. 
The following section therefore only describes the 
basics of the EU MRV process as designed by the 
Directive and implementation provisions.  
Each installation covered by the EU ETS needs to 
apply for a GHG emission permit,
33 which inter alia 
requires monitoring and reporting of emissions. Art. 
14 in the EU ETS Directive requires the European 
Commission to adopt legally binding Guidelines for 
Monitoring and Reporting (MRG)
34 of emissions 
based on Annex IV of the Directive, which include 
accuracy, timeliness and integrity. The framework on 
monitoring and reporting is completed by verification 
and a registry.  
Each installation develops a monitoring methodology 
based on their interpretation of the MRG; the 
methodology must be approved by the competent 
authority in each member state. These methodologies 
are principally based on a combination of emissions 
factors, fuel use and production data.
35 The MRG sets 
different ‘tiers’ of monitoring methodologies, with 
the top tier the most accurate (and usually the most 
expensive). Installations are required to use the top 
‘tier’ unless they can show it is impractical or will 
result in disproportionate costs. In these cases, the 
Competent Authority (CA), or responsible agency in 
                                                        
31 The EU ETS review is mandated to start in mid-2006 at 
the latest. 
32 For the case of the EU ETS, see Zapfel & Vainio (2002). 
33 Different member states use different terminology (e.g., 
the plan in the UK or protocol in the Netherlands).  
34 European Commission Decision establishing guidelines 
for the reporting of greenhouse gas emissions pursuant to 
Directive 2003/87/EC of the European Parliament and of 
the Council, 2004 O.J. (L 59) 1-74. 
35 MRG defines “monitoring methodology” as “the 
methodology used for the determination of emissions, 
including the choice between calculation or measurement 
and the choice of tiers”, i.e. a hierarchy of different 
ambition levels.  
each member state, can waive this obligation and 
drop the installation’s methodology to a lower tier.
36  
With the exception of Germany, member states have 
agreed that the installation-specific monitoring 
methodology should be part of the permitting 
procedure.
37 Installation-specific methodologies are 
submitted for approval to the CA. The underlying 
philosophy is to reduce the possibility of error and 
instil confidence for both participants and regulators. 
Operators at each installation report their emissions 
according to the methodology specified in its permit. 
Although operators must ensure their reports comply 
with the applicable methodology, an independent 
third party must verify all self-reported emissions. 
This third party is usually a non-governmental 
independent entity. However, in exceptional and 
justified cases verification can be done by a 
government body.
38 The verifier determines whether 
emissions have been monitored and reported in 
accordance with the validated methodology in the 
permit. In some countries (e.g. UK, Germany and 
Portugal) verifiers have also checked baseline 
emissions. 
Government supervision is generally carried out 
throughout the accreditation process.
39 In order to 
prove suitability (e.g. technical qualification, 
independence from the installation being verified), 
verifiers must be accredited in member states. In 
most cases, member states use existing accreditation 
bodies. Once accredited, verifiers in principle have 
the final word on an installation’s report. Currently, 
there is coordination at EU level to promote 
consistency in the accreditation process for verifiers. 
But there is not yet a harmonised approach, as 
competence requirements for verifiers are still being 
defined. Because the verifier has the final say on an 
installation’s report, particular importance is attached 
to ensure that verifiers perform their tasks accurately. 
Accordingly, the CA must ensure that those 
                                                        
36 US-style CEMs are possible but are not expected to be 
used. There is a difference in opinion between European 
and US officials about the benefits of CEMs. In Europe, 
there are doubts about the value from both a cost and 
accuracy point of view. In the US, CEMs are viewed as 
highly accurate and cost effective for monitoring of SO2 
and NOx at certain types of sources.
 
37 Germany set out its monitoring and reporting 
requirements in the permits by reference to general rules. 
38 The Directive requires verified data in accordance with a 
number of criteria set out in Annex V of the Directive, 
such as the quality and accuracy of the measuring 
equipment, effective data management systems, 
transparency of processes and public access to data. 
39 Should the need arise, member states have supervisory 
powers such as inspections and sample controls in parallel 
with verification. 8 | Kruger & Egenhofer 
 
accredited as verifiers are qualified and supervised 
via regular inspections and sample controls.  
Although verifiers’ tasks are similar to an auditor 
reviewing a firm’s financial accounts, their work is 
distinct from financial auditors. For example, a 
verifier’s areas of expertise include a technical 
background. Thus, qualified engineers who are 
familiar with the technical issues of emissions 
measurement can be employed as a verifier.  
Similar to the United States, EU member states try to 
create administrative certainty by making programme 
operations routine. For example, the Netherlands has 
developed a standard validation protocol aimed at 
ensuring that the monitoring protocols proposed by 
the operators in their request for a permit would be 
approved (‘validated’) in a uniform way. This was to 
limit discretion in the validation process. A second 
protocol, on guidance for accreditation of verifiers 
was developed in early 2004. This protocol has been 
developed in cooperation with members of states, 
industry and the International Emissions Trading 
Association (IETA) for use by the European Co-
operation for Accreditation (EA), a voluntary 
cooperative effort of European Accreditation bodies, 
to develop its Guidance on Verification (EA 6/03). A 
number of member states have made the use of EA 
6/03 obligatory in their national legislation. Some 
member states concentrate on improving national 
verification procedures, while other member states 
are as yet undecided. In the future, it is likely that the 
European Commission will provide more guidance in 
order to achieve a higher degree of standardisation of 
procedures. Although there is far less reliance on 
information technologies to operate the programme 
and automate routine procedures in comparison to the 
United States, some member states, such as Finland, 
the Netherlands and the UK, have started to 
progressively standardise electronic formats to make 
better use of information technology.  
There is an important similarity between the United 
States and the EU in that excess emissions penalties 
are non-discretionary and automatic.
40 To further 
strengthen compliance, operators are not only subject 
to penalties but also must surrender allowances in the 
following period (the importance of non-
discriminatory and automatic penalties in the United 
States is discussed above). But in line with the far 
more decentralised political environment of the EU, 
administrative and criminal penalties are to date 
entirely the responsibility of member states, as the 
                                                        
40 The EU example shows that governments faced barriers 
within national administrations to design and apply non-
discretionary and automatic penalties. The reason was that 
such penalties have not been foreseen in existing 
administrative, legal, and procedural requirements. In some 
cases, law-making instructions would even prevent them.  
EU has no competence in this area. However, 
relevant member states provisions need to be 
communicated to the European Commission. 
Additionally, a ruling last year by the European Court 
of Justice asserted that the EU has the power to 
require member states to lay down criminal penalties 
for the purpose of protecting the environment.
41 
Reported emissions data is collected in a registry that 
can be used to measure compliance by comparing the 
verified emissions of an installation with the number 
of allowances the installation holds, which is also 
known as the tracking of allowances. The registry 
amounts to a hub and spoke system consisting of one 
European hub in the form of the EU transaction log 
and 25 different member states registries, which 
communicate through standardised protocols and the 
EU. In the future, it is anticipated that member states 
will develop joint registries (see below). It is 
interesting to note that the Dutch NOx trading system 
initially had no automated registry, but the 
government decided to make maximum use of the 
procedures and structures as defined in the EU-ETS, 
thus seeking the maximum synergy possible between 
the two schemes 
Public Access to Data 
Emissions data will be publicly available as of the 
completion of the first Monitoring and Reporting 
Cycle (31 March 2006). Under Art. 17 of the EU 
ETS Directive, a full emissions report for every 
single installation needs to be published. Modalities 
for this are under discussion by member states, where 
making the data available online through a web page 
for each national registry has been discussed. Access 
to information and transparency in general depend on 
the degree of user-friendliness of the published data. 
Therefore, verified emissions of installations will be 
entered into a Verified Emissions Table of a member 
state registry. On May 15
th of each year, the Central 
Administrator and each member state registry will 
display on their public website the verified emissions 
figure for each installation as well as the allowances 
surrendered for that installation and whether or not 
that installation is in compliance with its obligations. 
The emissions figure for every single installation can 
be accessed through the Community Independent 
Transaction Log (CITL) website. This process should 
be made largely routine.  
Participant Perspectives on Compliance 
With emissions trading systems, it is not just the 
regulator who is concerned about compliance. The 
regulated community and other participants and 
                                                        
41 European Court of Justice of the European Communities 
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investors all share a common interest with regulators 
in achieving high levels of compliance. Otherwise, 
cheating or even the perception of cheating can risk 
devaluing allowances, thereby reducing or 
eliminating the economic incentive to cut emissions. 
To underscore this common interest in compliance, it 
is worth examining the different perspectives of 
participants in emissions trading systems.  
Participants in the emissions market require a stable 
and predictable environment. At the same time, 
governments, citizens and environmental NGOs 
demand that environmental objectives are met. By 
and large, these two priorities, i.e. stability and 
efficacy, are compatible and even mutually 
dependent. Even if emitters, governments and 
environmental NGOs are likely to hold different 
views on the severity of the targets, the ‘market’ 
prefers credible targets that not only increase 
liquidity, but also reassure governments and society 
that the trading process will lead to credible 
reductions in GHG emissions. Consistent and fraud-
proof monitoring and verification procedures 
therefore have moved to the centre of emissions 
trading schemes. While this debate initially focused 
on accuracy and credibility, with progressive 
implementation the spotlight turns to costs, notably 
how to reduce them.  
EU Governments’ Perspectives 
Interest in emissions trading in the EU has been 
triggered by a number of different reasons. First were 
its potential economic merits. Emissions trading 
promises least-cost abatement and allows industry a 
high degree of flexibility in how to meet the 
environmental objectives. Second, emissions trading 
was seen as particularly well suited to climate change 
policy as a means of translating absolute national 
targets into sector- and installation-specific targets. 
Third, governments were attracted by the cap, which 
gives assurance that the environmental objective is 
met. It was thought that emissions trading could be a 
means to address implementation and enforcement 
deficits that were increasingly becoming apparent 
within the EU and were expected to widen with 
enlargement. Finally, after aborted attempts by the 
EC to introduce a carbon tax and by industry to reach 
voluntary agreements to cut emissions, a market-
based system became the most attractive option for 
tackling climate change, especially when compared 
to the largely unworkable command-and-control 
alternatives. 
Success with the EU ETS, both in terms of reducing 
emissions and establishing mandatory trading 
systems as a useful regulatory strategy to address 
climate change, is essential for the EU to maintain its 
credibility in international climate negotiations. 
While success for the EU ETS depends on a variety 
of factors, its MRV strategies will play a large role in 
its environmental effectiveness, economic efficiency 
(including establishing a level playing field for 
businesses throughout the EU and the world) and 
political acceptability. 
US Government Perspective 
Emissions trading has become the policy of choice 
for legislators and programme administrators in the 
United States to address regional air pollution. This is 
both because the programmes have proven effective 
and because they have satisfied a variety of 
competing interests. 
Without a doubt, the existence of stringent 
monitoring and enforcement provisions in the 1990 
Clean Air Act gave policy makers the confidence to 
experiment with the flexibility of the ‘cap and trade’ 
approach. Most recently, all of the major legislative 
proposals in Congress for further reductions of 
multiple pollutants featured a cap and trade structure. 
Finally, although there is still controversy in the 
United States about the adoption of a cap on 
greenhouse gases, emissions trading is generally 
viewed as the inevitable approach if the United States 
adopts a mandatory policy.  
Regulated Firms, Market Participants and 
Investors  
Business and industry have supported the 
introduction of emissions trading largely because 
they are identical to government’s motives although 
the weighting of motivations varies. While business 
and industry may value least-cost abatement and 
flexibility the most, they also can see the additional 
advantage of a management focus on cost-effective 
abatement possibilities. Managers will try to exploit 
opportunities through better carbon management and 
participation in the trading market. Turning such 
opportunities into reality requires efficient and 
effective MRV.  
A majority of firms operating in the EU have made 
emissions trading and the EU ETS their instrument of 
choice, given perceived economic advantages. But 
the future of the EU ETS depends on its credibility. 
Effective MRV strategies play a key role here by 
boosting its credibility as well as helping firms 
identify overlooked reduction opportunities, as the 
experience of BP and others suggest.
42 
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below its 1990 level had a net benefit of $650 million. 
Reductions were a direct consequence of the internal BP 
cap-and-trade scheme. The associated MRV enabled the 
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Other participants in the system have a somewhat 
different perspective. Industry participants are most 
interested in establishing and maintaining a level 
playing field – that is, that firms believe their 
competitors are in compliance and, if not, will be 
identified and sanctioned.  
In addition, investors and traders are generally most 
interested in determining the degree to which 
allowances are sheltered from the risk of devaluation. 
In other words: they don’t want to lose money 
investing in carbon. The two main sources of risk of 
devaluation are widespread cheating and uncertainty 
brought on by ineffective MRV strategies and a 
wholesale change in regulatory policy. 
The perspectives of industry and market participants 
in the United States are similar to those in Europe. 
Svendsen (1998) found that the flexibility of the ‘cap 
and trade’ approach, coupled with increased 
competition in the electric power sector, is one of the 
main reasons the US electric power industry prefers a 
grandfathered tradable permits market over other 
regulatory approaches. One industry representative 
notes that US trading programmes have worked well 
because the role of regulators is to “to get the system 
up and working, to ensure compliance and to report 
on progress”.
43 Swift (2001) argues that this focus on 
emissions results rather than on compliance choices 
creates less friction between regulators and 
companies because it reduces transaction costs and 
avoids delays inherent in the review of industry 
strategies. This represents a considerable 
improvement over earlier emissions trading 
programmes, in which case-by-case reviews of trades 
contributed to delays and uncertainties.
44 Similarly, 
brokers and traders have also supported strong 
compliance provisions as a prerequisite for the 
development of the market. For example, one broker 
has noted in testimony before the US Congress: 
There is no “natural benefit” for owning a 
tradable emissions right. Their only value is 
compliance with the law. Consequently, there 
must be a fate worse than trading if trading is to 
succeed. Accordingly, penalties for non-
compliance must be severe when compared to 
the costs of trading (including the time and effort 
to execute the trades). And, just as importantly, 
penalties must be enforced.
45 
 
                                                                                       
Similar experiences were reported by Entergy, Toyota, and 
Rio Tinto.  
43 Kruger (2005); see also Hart (2000); Chartier (1997); 
Kosobud (2001) and White (2003a)  (reviewing industry 
views on the SO2 trading programme). 
44 Hahn & Hester (1989). 
45 Bartels, Fitzgerald (1997). 
While industry generally supports monitoring and 
verification provisions in the SO2 and NOx 
programmes, some companies have expressed 
concerns about the high monitoring costs and 
complexity related to continuous emissions monitors. 
A. Denny Ellerman et al. (2000) found that these 
costs were as much as 7% of overall compliance 
costs during the first phase of the SO2 programme. 
However, they also note elsewhere that “regulated 
firms seem to be unanimous in expressing their 
preference for this type of regulation, presumably 
because the gains in reduced direct compliance costs 
more than offset whatever compliance costs are 
involved in monitoring…”
46 
Non-Governmental Organisations and the 
Public 
In both the United States and Europe, the main 
attraction for NGOs has been the environmental 
certainty as a result of an absolute cap.
47 Such 
certainty however depends on the credibility of 
MRV. Environmental NGOs demand that 
environmental objectives are met. Hence, there is 
convergence between emitters and NGOs, although 
the devil is in the details.  
Compliance Challenges 
Effective implementation of MRV rules is central to 
providing trust in the system as well as to offerinf a 
major potential for efficiency improvements by 
bringing down costs associated with MRV and 
emissions trading in general. This has notably been 
demonstrated for US trading schemes such as the SO2 
trading and the NOx Budget Trading Programmes.
48 
Arguably, for the US acid rain programmes and the 
NOx Budget Trading Programme, measuring and 
monitoring have been the most complex and costly 
element components of the trading scheme. The EU 
ETS is somewhat different as GHG emissions are not 
actually measured, but calculated based on energy 
use or other proxies. However, this does not 
automatically mean that one of the methods is 
superior to the other.  
                                                        
46 Ellerman et al. (2003). 
47 Early opposition to SO2 trading by much of the 
environmental community in the United States has faded as 
the programme has shown significant environmental 
results and emission ‘hot spots’ have not emerged (See 
Kruger & Dean, 1997). However, there is still opposition 
to emissions trading of conventional pollution by some 
environmental groups. Most recently, much of this 
opposition has focused on mercury trading. 
48 See, e.g. Mangis (1998) and Holmstead (2002). Confidence through Compliance in Emissions Trading Markets | 11 
 
The United States: Future Cap and Trade 
Compliance Issues and Challenges  
Although compliance procedures for US SO2 and 
NOx programmes are well established, there is much 
uncertainty about the design of any future mandatory 
programme for greenhouse gases in the United 
States. There are a number of factors that could shape 
the MRV procedures of such a programme. Key 
questions, which are discussed below, include: 
•  What will be the scope and point of regulation of 
such a programme? 
•  What role will continuous emissions monitors 
play? 
•  How will state and regional ‘cap and trade’ 
programmes affect a potential national 
programme? 
•  What will be the impact of voluntary protocols 
and registries? 
Scope and Point of Regulation 
Ultimately, the scope and point of regulation of a 
potential trading programme could have an impact on 
the types of MRV systems developed. To the extent 
that a programme might just cover the electric power 
sector, it is likely that the MRV system would build 
upon the existing model used in the SO2 and NOx 
programmes. As noted, most electric power sources 
already report their CO2 emissions to EPA.  
The details of a potential MRV system are less 
certain in legislative proposals that address sectors 
beyond electric power. Specifically, two legislative 
proposals – the McCain-Lieberman bill and a 
proposal by Senator Bingaman – are for economy-
wide programmes that would cover multiple sectors. 
In the case of McCain-Lieberman, emissions from 
the electric power and industrial sectors are regulated 
‘downstream’ (i.e. at the smokestack) while 
emissions from the transport sector are regulated 
‘upstream’ based on the emissions potential of fuels 
processed by oil refineries. In contrast, under the 
Bingaman proposal, the point of regulation is entirely 
upstream at fuel producers, processors or transporters 
(e.g. natural gas pipelines). Thus, new protocols for 
monitoring, verifying, and reporting the emissions 
potential from upstream sources and the emissions 
from some downstream industrial sectors might be 
necessary.
49  
                                                        
49 Because of the jurisdictions of the Senate committees 
responsible for these bills, there are different 
administrative agencies involved in developing guidelines 
or operating the programmes. Under the McCain-
Lieberman proposal, the programme would be 
administered by EPA, but emissions monitoring guidelines 
would be developed by the Department of Commerce. 
Under the Bingaman proposal, the US Department of 
Energy would have overall responsibility for the 
Use of CEMs 
CEMs are a cornerstone of the emissions monitoring 
system in conventional US pollution trading 
programmes. But what factors and considerations 
will determine their use in a potential greenhouse gas 
trading programme? First, as the discussion above 
notes, one important factor will be the point of 
regulation. For example, if the point of regulation is 
entirely upstream, CEMs will not be used at all. 
CEMs would only be an option in trading 
programmes where some or all of the point of 
regulation is downstream. Second, it is important to 
note that the existing CO2 reporting requirement for 
electric power facilities does not require CEMs and 
allows facilities to choose alternative methods. 
Approximately 40% of units that report CO2 
emissions to EPA use CEMs and 60% use alternative 
methods. This represents about 87% of CO2 
emissions that are measured with CEMs. Most of the 
units that use CO2 CEMs are coal-fired units, while 
oil and gas-fired units generally use alternative 
methods. Third, to the extent that sources already use 
CEMs (i.e. in the power sector), there may be a 
strong incentive to continue to use those existing 
systems. For example, Regional Greenhouse Gas 
Initiative (RGGI) states have proposed using the 
existing reporting system for CO2 (i.e. CEMs for 
some units and alternative methods for others). This 
proposal has received support from industry 
stakeholders, who presumably do not want to develop 
a new or additional monitoring and reporting system 
(See Northeast Greenhouse Gas Coalition, 2004). In 
contrast, the motivation to use CEMs may not be as 
strong for facilities outside the power sector, since 
they are not currently reporting CO2 t o  E P A .  I n  
addition, for some sectors with process or fugitive 
emissions, using CEMs may not be feasible or 
practical.  
Impacts of State and Regional Programmes 
A further uncertainty about the design of future US 
GHG trading programmes is the impact of state and 
regional programmes that are now under 
development. The most advanced of these efforts is 
the RGGI, a cap and trade programme under 
development by nine states in the northeastern and 
mid-Atlantic United States. Initially, the programme 
will address CO2 emissions from the electric power 
sector. However, the programme may be expanded to 
include additional sectors and GHGs. In general, the 
RGGI programme has proposed to use compliance 
and enforcement structures similar to those used in 
the US NOx trading programme. In addition, as noted 
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above, the programme has proposed using CO2 data 
currently reported to EPA. 
West Coast states may develop a different model for 
a ‘cap and trade’ programme. Concerns about 
addressing imports of power from outside the state 
have led some stakeholders to advocate design 
approaches that focus on the distribution of electric 
power rather than generation. For example, an 
advisory group to the Governor of Oregon has 
recommended a tradable carbon content standard for 
power consumed in the state, which would take 
power imports into account. (Governors Advisory 
Group, 2004). California is considering a proposal to 
allocate allowances to load-serving entities, which 
would be required to hold allowances to cover the 
emissions of the electric power they distribute 
(CCAP, 2005). Such a programme might require 
some sort of programme for monitoring or estimating 
emissions associated with power imported from 
outside the state. How these programmes might 
address MRV and other compliance and enforcement 
issues has not yet been determined.  
Impacts of Voluntary Efforts 
A final uncertainty is the impact of voluntary 
greenhouse gas reporting protocols and registries on a 
potential mandatory US weighting national system. 
For example, more than ten states have adopted or 
are in the process of adopting voluntary registries for 
greenhouse gas emissions (PPI, 2003). Most notable 
is the California Climate Action Registry 
Programme, which uses a greenhouse gas reporting 
protocol based on the reporting protocol of the World 
Resources Institute (WRI) and World Business 
Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD). 
There are also federal greenhouse gas reporting and 
registry programmes. Under the EPA Climate 
Leaders Programmes, companies develop 
comprehensive greenhouse gas inventories, set 
corporate emission reduction targets and report 
annually their emissions and progress towards 
reaching their targets. The programme’s reporting 
protocol is based on the WRI/WBCSD protocol, and 
it requires entity-wide reporting. Under the Voluntary 
Reporting of Greenhouse Gases Programme, 
established by Section 1605(b) of the Energy Policy 
Act of 1992, organisations and individuals who have 
reduced their emissions may record their 
accomplishments and publicise their actions. This 
programme encourages entity-wide reporting but 
provides also flexibility in defining the reporting 
entity. 
Voluntary reporting schemes and registries have a 
number of benefits, including helping corporations 
understand the scope of their emissions and the 
possible mitigation measures that they might take. 
Voluntary reporting programmes may also raise 
awareness of the climate change issue and highlight 
the actions of companies who are leaders in reducing 
their emissions. Ultimately, voluntary reporting 
schemes and registries are made for different 
purposes than compliance rules of mandatory 
programmes.  
Several aspects of voluntary protocols may require 
revision or further development to be suitable for 
mandatory trading programmes. This is because there 
is an inherent tension in voluntary protocols, which 
must balance the desire to encourage participation 
with the costs associated with a rigorous emissions 
reporting programme. If measurement and reporting 
requirements are too rigorous and costly, there will 
be few participants. Conversely, if programme 
reporting restrictions are too lenient, the resulting 
emissions data may not be an appropriate foundation 
for a future mandatory programme. In addition, some 
voluntary registries and protocols require reporting at 
the company-wide level rather than the facility level. 
While this is appropriate for a voluntary programme 
that tracks a corporate emissions goal, it is less useful 
for a sector-wide or economy-wide mandatory 
trading programme, where it is important to carefully 
track emissions at the facility level. Existing 
conventional air pollution control programmes 
require emissions reporting at the unit or facility 
level, in part because of the complexity of tracking 
shifts in corporate structure. 
Nevertheless, experimentation with voluntary 
protocols by industry may lead to the development of 
better emissions estimation methodologies. This may 
be particularly true for sectors such as iron and steel, 
where emissions monitoring or estimation is less than 
straightforward. This experience would certainly 
inform the development of future US mandatory 
guidelines for emissions monitoring. Gradual 
alignment of voluntary reporting schemes and 
registries with compliance rules of mandatory 
programmes could facilitate transition to a regulated 
programme. 
Compliance Challenges for the EU  
Implementation of important new EU legislation is 
typically approached in a ‘learning by doing’ mode in 
which various member states experiment with 
different national responses to EU framework 
legislation. In the absence of a central federal 
enforcement agency, the European Commission 
provides guidance while at the same time ensuring 
compliance with laws. Non-compliance will result in 
member states being taken to the European courts. 
Additionally, member states supported by the 
European Commission share experiences and 
eventually identify best practices. Thus, there are 
numerous multi-stakeholder initiatives that attempt to Confidence through Compliance in Emissions Trading Markets | 13 
 
incrementally harmonise procedures (‘soft 
harmonisation’).
50  
The challenge for the EU and its member states is to 
transpose the MRV provisions into national 
legislation, taking into account the local institutional 
landscape and legal circumstances (including 
established practices), while at the same time 
ensuring an adequate degree of harmonisation across 
member states. Additionally, although the EU has 
looked to the US NOx budget trading programme, 
which is more decentralised than the SO2 
programme, the EU is largely on its own in 
developing a decentralised model.  
Principal Challenges  
Within the EU ETS, the major challenge is to ensure 
consistent implementation of MRV across member 
states. Effective implementation of MRV is an 
integral part of enforcement and deterrence, which 
are preconditions for compliance. Achieving 
consistency – a permanent challenge for the EU – 
requires creating similar procedures across member 
states. This offers considerable efficiency gains and 
ensures a level playing field (i.e. allows for 
undistorted competition within the EU internal 
market). 
Consistency starts with the quality of the member 
state permit, which includes the incorporation of 
MRG. Member states’ rules will differ depending on 
the nature, frequency, and depth of inspections to be 
carried out. It is also likely that member states will 
vary in how rigorously they enforce national and EU 
law. A great number of differences between member 
states could affect the level playing field of 
competing companies and, at the extreme, may lead 
to gaming. There is also a risk that, if flexibility leads 
to inconsistencies within or between member states, 
national regulators may extend their intervention. 
Another challenge for the EU is to clarify 
institutional responsibilities. Currently, 
responsibilities for MRV in the EU and its member 
states lie with the EC, 25 member states, more than 
150 Competent Authorities,
51 around 11,500 
installations and an uncertain number of verifiers and 
accreditation bodies. While the EU ETS Directive 
and subsequent legislation in principle have assigned 
responsibilities, in practice the boundaries might 
sometimes be blurred. The critical intersections are 
European Commission and member states, 
Competent Authorities and companies, verifiers and 
accreditation bodies. 
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51 Federal EU member states such as Belgium, Spain or 
Germany typically have more than one Competent 
Authority. 
The final challenge relates to verification, and 
notably to ensuring harmonised rules for 
accreditation. Major diversity in stringency of 
accreditation is likely to affect the credibility of the 
EU ETS. To date, there are a number of differences 
in the competence requirements between various 
member states. These differences are partly fuelled 
by the member state’s fears of lacking the necessary 
verifiers. Member states are trying to find the right 
balance between qualification requirements and 
ensuring the availability of sufficient verifiers. 
Initial Responses 
Some of the challenges, such as the initial 
competence assessment of verifiers and jurisdiction 
issues for different institutions, are typical issues for 
a new and ambitious scheme that is breaking new 
ground. They will be addressed during the first round 
of compliance through different processes. The 
Working Group III sub-committee on the comitology 
address some of these issues, but its mandate is not to 
achieve full harmonisation. Rather, it is to ensure that 
member state implementation is in line with EU law. 
There are also complementary initiatives aiming at 
voluntary harmonisation by member states. Such 
voluntary harmonisation initiatives in many cases 
seek the active involvement of stakeholders.  
There has already been progress on further 
harmonisation of verification and accreditation 
standards and procedures. This includes the 
application of the European Co-operation for 
Accreditation’s (EA) Guidance for Recognition of 
Verification Bodies under EU ETS Directive.
52 Many 
member states – particularly those that have 
Accreditation Bodies that are members of the EA – 
are looking to use this document as the basis for 
setting up accreditation schemes for verification 
bodies. In addition, member states are currently 
developing a common Verification Reference Model, 
which covers all elements for an effective control of 
monitoring, reporting, verification and accreditation. 
The Verification Reference Model can be used as a 
model for both GHG verification procedures and the 
principal elements of the verification framework by 
outlining the respective responsibilities of the CAs 
and accreditation bodies. This includes the 
responsibilities as set out in the Directive, MRG, and 
EA 6/03. Additionally, CAs are encouraged to use it 
to self-assess their situation. An EU-wide 
Verification Resource Centre will assist the 
authorities in their verification exercise focusing on 
processes, the verification statement, and the 
qualification profile of verifiers. Also, focus groups 
with interested representatives from member states 
and CAs are about to be launched on the following 
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issues: mutual recognition of verifiers; exchange of 
best practices in running ETS verification; and risk 
analysis. 
Theoretically, the EU could establish a common, or 
at least regional, accreditation body that is 
responsible for accreditation of verifiers on an EU-
wide basis. This would have obvious advantages 
related to consistency and uniformity of accreditation 
within the EU. The feasibility of creating a common 
EU accreditation body as a real political option is 
unclear but remains unlikely unless the European 
Commission takes a lead on this. The creation of 
regional accreditation bodies appears to be more 
likely. Another alternative option is that accreditation 
bodies in all EU member states follow similar rules 
for accreditation. Some member states are already 
allowing mutual recognition,
53 but may require that 
accreditation bodies (e.g. UKAS) carry out some 
form of supervision or surveillance of verification 
bodies when they work in another member state for 
the first time.  
Cost Considerations  
While the initial focus of MRV will remain on 
implementation and capacity-building, more recently 
cost considerations have risen on the agenda. As one 
of the promises of the EU ETS has been cost-
effectiveness, the EU, member states and 
stakeholders monitor costs and identify areas where 
excessive costs can be avoided. Potential areas for 
attention are verification and small installations.  
As was pointed out above, there are differences in 
verification and accreditation of verifiers not only 
between the 25 member states but within some 
member states. This can increase costs for 
international companies wishing to apply uniform 
monitoring and reporting procedures for one verifier 
throughout the EU.
54 Annual costs for verification are 
generally estimated to range between €25 and $30 
million dollars per annum.
55 
It can be argued that the inclusion of small 
installations in the EU ETS can lead to high 
                                                        
53 ‘Mutual recognition’ is a central element of the EU’s 
internal market for goods. It describes that fact that EU 
member states are required to recognise marketing 
authorisation issued in another member state as long as the 
product complies with EU minimum health and safety 
standards (‘essential requirements’). In services, the 
validity of the mutual recognition principle remains 
controversial.  
54 For international verifiers wishing to serve their 
international customers, it can mean between 40 and 50 
accreditations to different schemes with increased costs 
and reduced availability of verifiers in the market.  
55 This assumes a cost range for verification per installation 
from €1,000 and €20,000 for big installations. 
administrative costs for both governments and the 
covered sources. For small installations with 
emissions of less than 25,000 tonnes of CO2, 
additional costs for establishing, monitoring and 
reporting can be disproportional to the environmental 
benefit.
56 Therefore, one of the principal priorities of 
the revision of the ETS MRG is cost-efficiency – 
specifically, to lighten the administrative burden for 
small installations.
57 This will be part of the MRG 
review that is planned to be formalised by spring 
2006. 
The Role of Performance Management: 
Measuring Success 
As governments continue to experiment with 
emissions trading systems, evaluation of the results 
of these systems will be increasingly important.
58 
There has been little explicit research on how best to 
measure the success and performance of enforcement 
and compliance systems in emissions trading 
programmes. However, there has been an effort by 
INECE, OECD and several governments to develop 
compliance and enforcement indicators for 
environmental programmes in general.
59 Work by 
                                                        
56 See Egenhofer & Fujiwara (2005). While costs can be 
important, emissions from small installations may not be. 
For example, excluding installations with emissions lower 
than 10,000 tonnes CO2/year would mean to reduce the 
number of participants in the EU by 32% (or about 3,400 
participants), but decrease emissions coverage in the ETS 
by only 1%. Excluding installations under 25,000 tonnes 
CO2/year would reduce the total number of participants 
dramatically (-55%), while reducing the included 
emissions by only 2.4%. Worrel & Woosen (2005). 
57 Practically speaking, the following points are under 
discussion: 1) establishing a list of exemptions from 
requirements of MRG for small installations; 2) reducing 
and simplifying requirements for the monitoring of 
biomass fuels; 3) widening the scope for simplified 
approaches for minor sources; 4) simplifying approaches 
for standardised commercial fuels; 5) creating 
differentiated requirements for the accreditation of 
laboratory analyses; 6) including several existing 
commercially relevant practices to determine production 
and stock data; and 7) considering the optional use of 
differentiated oxidation factors. 
58 See Markowitz et al. (2005). 
59 The Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) defines ‘enforcement indicators’ as 
“those measurable pieces of information that inform about 
compliance promotion, compliance monitoring, and non-
compliance response.” Environmental compliance and 
enforcement indicators are sometimes divided into two 
categories: output based indicators and outcome based 
indicators. Output based indicators are activities or services 
performed by a government programme during a specific 
time period. These could include the number of inspections 
performed or the number of penalties assessed. Outcome 
indicators are tied to the environmental effects of a Confidence through Compliance in Emissions Trading Markets | 15 
 
these organisations and governments has pointed to 
several benefits of using performance indicators, 
including helping programme managers understand 
the effectiveness of their programmes and help 
improve environmental programmes over time.
60  
Traditionally, environmental programme 
administrators have used output-based indicators 
such as the number of enforcement cases initiated or 
penalties assessed because these indicators are easy 
to measure and are directly tied to compliance and 
enforcement efforts. However, these types of metrics 
pose a dilemma. In an ideal environmental 
programme, one would expect high compliance and 
few penalties assessed. The question is whether this 
outcome is the result of good compliance or poor 
enforcement. Moreover, these types of measurements 
are often not a good gauge of the overall success of 
an environmental programme. Because of the 
shortcomings of these types of indicators, the 
literature suggests more sophisticated measures are 
necessary to address the multiple audiences for 
information on programme performance. For 
example, Stahl notes, “A combination of measures – 
outputs and outcomes, quantitative and quantitative, 
statistical and narrative, aggregated and 
disaggregated, national and local – is necessary . . .”
61  
In US trading programmes, both output and outcome 
data are used to evaluate the performance of 
compliance and enforcement decisions. For example, 
examples of indicators include: 
•  Percentage of sources subjected to environmental 
audits; 
•  Percentage availability of emissions monitors; 
•  Results of relative accuracy tests for monitors; 
•  Number of enforcement actions taken and 
penalties assessed; and  
•  Overall compliance rate of affected sources. 
The programmes also use a variety of outcome 
indicators to measure the overall effectiveness of the 
programmes, including emissions and deposition 
reduced, as well as changes in the environment 
attributable to emission reductions. For the most part, 
                                                                                       
programme, including interim effects such as tons of 
emissions reduced. See Stahl (2004).  
60 Other benefits of performance indicators may include: 
helping programme managers understand the relationships 
between programme activities, such as inspections and 
audits, and the change in behaviour or performance by the 
regulated community; enhancing the accountability and 
credibility of environmental programmes with outside 
stakeholders; and monitoring internal operations and 
maximising the efficient use of government resources. See 
Stahl (2003). 
61 Ibid.  
compliance and enforcement measures are viewed as 
a component of the overall system, including the 
overall environmental results, costs and market 
function. A number of studies have looked at the 
compliance results of these programmes in the 
context of the overall performance of the 
programmes.
62  
Conclusion: Towards a Common Currency 
The preceding sections have highlighted the 
differences and similarities between the United States 
and EU approaches to MRV in emissions trading 
systems. Ultimately, there may be additional 
variations on these models, as Canada, Japan and 
other countries begin to adopt domestic emissions 
trading systems. Given these differences in approach, 
what will be the best way to proceed towards a 
common currency? 
The first step to answering this question is to 
understand the extent to which different approaches 
might lead to different results. For example, would 
reported emissions from a facility be significantly 
different with US methodologies than EU 
methodologies? To what extent are differences 
procedural rather than substantive? A more technical 
analysis of monitoring methodologies will be 
necessary to answer these questions. 
A second consideration will be a more general need 
to understand the MRV issues that arise when 
different national trading programmes are linked.
63 
The ultimate laboratory for understanding these 
linkage issues will be the first year(s) of 
implementation of the EU ETS. As discussed, there is 
flexibility among EU member states in how they 
implement MRV guidelines. Understanding the 
proper balance between flexibility and consistency in 
the EU ETS will be very useful as a test case for 
linking domestic systems.  
Finally, further dialogue between experts is necessary 
to build on understanding of the unique features of 
the EU and US models. US observers may need more 
information on how third-party verification actually 
works in an emissions trading programme. For 
example, what will be the impacts of third party 
verification on the administrative efficiency of the 
verification process? EU and member state officials 
                                                        
62 Burtraw & Palmer (2003); Ellerman et al. (2000) 
(providing recent assessments of the SO2 programme); 
Farrell (2001) and Burtraw & Evans (2003) (providing an 
assessment of the nine state NOx OTC programmes). 
63 In addition to MR&V issues, there are a number of 
additional issues that come into play when different 
emissions trading systems are linked, including: relative 
cap stringency; trading and banking rules and other design 
elements. 16 | Kruger & Egenhofer 
 
may need more information on whether the 
information technology-based system used in the 
United States for reporting and verification will be 
flexible enough to meet the needs of diverse member 
states. In addition, there may be questions about 
whether this type of approach could be applied to the 
wider universe of sectors and installations in the EU 
ETS. Ultimately, sharing detailed information about 
different MRV systems will lead to better 
understanding of the costs and benefits of different 
approaches. This may be the best first step towards a 
common currency for emissions trading. 
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